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ABSCTRACT Introduction: The concept of “event” offers a valuable lens to understand the discursive contestations in and around pro-
tests. Events create ruptures that disturb the logic of continuity and open up new way of thinking and talking about the past and the fu-
ture. Drawing on this concept, this article analyzes the 2013 protests in Turkey and Brazil. It investigates how the causes of these
protests were framed and debated in each country and how these frames shifted over time by opening up new interpretations of the
past and the future.Materials andMethods:Data is generated from four Facebook pages capturing the messages posted during the first
30 days of protests in each country. In the Brazilian case, we collected the posts of: (1) Passe Livre São Paulo (301,787 likes), the group
that started the wave of protests; and (2) O Gigante Acordou (155,690 likes), a collective that emerged during the protests, represent-
ing nationalist perspectives. In total, 626 posts were collected from both pages. In the Turkish case, we analyzed posts that appeared
on the pages of : (1) Taksim Dayanismasi (82,479 likes), an association that played a significant role in organizing and mobilizing Gezi
Park protests; and (2) Recep Tayyip Erdogan (6,957,408 likes), a pro-government and inherently anti-protest page. We coded each
post inductively focusing particularly on the way they framed the causes of the protests. We then identified the number of times each
frame was mentioned during the first 30 days of the protests and explored whether and how frames changed over time. Results: Our
analysis reveals a significant shift in the way the causes of the protests were framed over time in both countries, yet with different impli-
cations. While in Brazil, we observe a frame transformation undermining the initial rationale of the protests, in Turkey we see a frame
extension and the emergence of broader issues as the real causes of protests, such as the authoritarian nature of the regime and the re-
striction of democratic rights in this country. Discussion: The article offers a way of analysing protests based on a conceptual lens of
event. It sheds light on the role of social media as a platform for symbolic struggles over the protests. Furthermore, the article opens up
a debate about the developments of democracy in both countries.
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I. Introduction1
The recent wave of protests throughout the world has raised a series ofquestions and left many unanswered. What were the protests reallyabout? How did they start? Were they foreseeable? Were they about
small local issues or about the political or economic system as a whole? What
political implications, if any, did they have? These questions rapidly spread on
newspapers, television roundtables, scholarly books, everyday conversations,
and online posts.
In this article, we take these questions as our starting points and interpret
them as the manifestation of the concept of “event” in practice. In broader
terms, events refer to ruptures in the ordinary flows of life (Quéré 2005). They
usually displace the dominant constructions of reality and open up new ways of
seeing and interpreting it. Events shape the way past is understood and the fu-
ture is imagined. Events are not static occurrences with clear beginnings and
endings: they evolve and always carry a potential to be updated at different mo-
ments and locations in the future (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, p.158). As such,
they offer a useful way of making sense of the protests.
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The concept of event has long been used in social and political theory, as
well as in social movement studies (see, for example, McAdam & Sewell 2001;
Goodwin & Jasper 2004; Della Porta 2008). These studies offer useful insights
regarding when and how protest movements can be considered as events. Yet,
in doing so, they focus mainly on the transformative dimension of events. Ac-
cording to Della Porta (2008), for instance, only certain protests bear eventful
characteristics and have the potential to transform structures and collective
identities. Rather than focusing on the transformative dimension of events, this
article sheds light on another, equally significant dimension of events: the inter-
pretive (hermeneutic) dimension, as manifested in the discursive contests and
symbolic struggles they generate in the public sphere. Building on Mendonça
(2007), we argue that protests can be considered events to the extent they repre-
sent ruptures. These ruptures open up spaces for interpretation and reinterpreta-
tion of the past and the future in new directions.
There are various factors that can enhance the interpretive dimension of pro-
tests and contribute to their characterisation as events. The use of social media
platforms by protestors (and their opponents) is clearly one of them. There is a
growing body of literature focusing on the central role of social media commu-
nications in the recent wave of protests (Poell & Van Dijck 2018; Tufekci 2017;
Papacharissi 2015; La Rosa 2014; Castells 2012; Bennett & Segerberg 2013).
These studies rightly indicate that the “real-time” nature of social media com-
munications enhance the spectacle-form of media culture and thus influence the
event dimension of the recent wave of protests (Poell & Van Dijck 2018). They
offer spaces to reflect, watch, listen, interpret, and communicate various aspects
of the protests.
The article builds on these insights through a close analysis of social media
communications during the 2013 protests in Brazil and Turkey. In doing so, the
article uses the concept of event to make sense of the multiple and competing
narratives and rationales about the protests. We focus on the online conversa-
tions about the protests on four Facebook pages during the first 30-days of the
protests in both countries. We ask: How did they frame/explain the causes and
rationalities behind the protests? How did the framing contestations evolve over
time? Which frames were dominant? How were they related to the past and the
future?
This study answers these questions and understands the complex web of in-
terpretations (1) using the concept of “event” as its conceptual lens and (2) con-
ducing a close analysis of the ways in which protests are communicated on
Facebook pages. The analysis shows that the debates surrounding the 2013 pro-
tests revoked continuous reinterpretations of the past offering important impli-
cations for the future. What made the 2013 protests “eventful” is that, in both
countries, the rupture caused by them led to a scene of uncertainty and opened
up the stage for different political and social possibilities. As the time evolved,
in both countries new issues came to the front stage. In Brazil, we observe a
frame transformation regarding the reasons of the protests which ultimately un-
dermined the initial focus of the demonstrators. In Turkey, the discursive
contestations concerning the initial cause of the protests led to a frame extension
and opened a space for broader democratic questions.
The article has five sections. First, we unpack the meaning of “event” focus-
ing particularly on its political and interpretive (hermeneutic) dimensions. We
discuss the relevance of the concept of event to the recent protest movements.
The second section provides a brief description of the cases, the 2013 protests in
Turkey and Brazil, and presents the key similarities between these two cases.
The third section presents the data and the methods used to analyze four
Facebook pages in light of the conceptual lens provided by the event. The fourth
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section presents the analysis of Facebook’s posts, revealing the symbolic strug-
gles and framing contests over the causes of the protests in both countries. Fi-
nally, in the fifth section we consider the overall implications of our findings for
the future democratization movements in Turkey and Brazil.
II. Events and their Interpretive Dimension
An event can be understood as an occurrence that emerges in a certain con-
text and introduces a discontinuity in the flow of experiences (Quéré 2005). Dif-
ferent meanings are produced around the same occurrence, and they are not
merely correct or erroneous descriptions of a world that is already there. Rather,
these meanings are a part of the event itself and they have important implica-
tions for the event’s future developments. As such, events lead to framing con-
tests over the definition of the event itself. As a part of this iterative
meaning-making process, the frames employed to make sense of an event be-
come part of the event themselves, opening different possible futures.
It is in this sense that an event constructs both its past and future (Quéré
1995; Zizek 2014). It is not that the past did not exist, but it only makes sense
when it is re-narrated in present with its values and its interpretive frameworks.
The November 2015 Paris attacks, for instance, threw a new light into past rela-
tions between the so-called Christian West and Islamic groups. The questions
raised by the attacks opened up a different interpretation of the past relations:
What caused the attacks? Which international geopolitical factors did really
lead to the attacks? How were these attacks related to the colonial past of
France? While the event builds its own past, it establishes new futures. New sce-
narios may emerge and disclose new possibilities: How should “the world” re-
act to the attacks? Who should lead the process? Who is to be blamed? Are there
relationships between the event and immigration policies? By instantly disclos-
ing the contingency of the world and its future, the rupture generated by the
event posesABSTRACTmoral inquiries and everyday pragmatic questions to
society. In reconstructing the past and opening up new futures, events prove to
have a hermeneutic power (Quéré 2005).
Events are thus inherently political: they trigger new disputes and new nar-
ratives of the past and the future, affecting their present developments. They
trigger reactions and responses from individuals and evoke the need to reestab-
lish the continuous flow of experience demanding the normalization of the
event (Quéré 2005). While it may look like a rupture at first sight, the normal-
ization process turns the event into something perfectly explainable, on the ba-
sis of causes “already there” and other past occurrences. In this sense, events do
foster collective meaning-making process around thorny questions, which are
usually pushed aside by the inertia of the existing order. Events act as cracks
that make the world contingent again, calling for human action. Even if the steps
to be taken may seem as the only real possibilities, they were produced by actual
actions within a given context. Such actions are not entirely chosen nor deter-
mined by pre-existing structures. Rather, they are the products of an interchange
between individuals and their historical, social, cultural, and institutional
contexts.
The interpretive (hermeneutic) dimension of events has already been dis-
cussed in a wide range of studies. In the early 1900s, American Pragmatists
used it to discuss the contingency of reality and its moral and political implica-
tions. Mead used the concept to highlight the centrality of haphazard in human
experiences and the temporal dimension of these experiences (Joas 1997). As
Mead (1932, p.32) put it, an event “creates with its uniqueness a past and a fu-
ture. As soon as we view it, it becomes a history and a prophecy.” Dewey fur-
ther developed the political dimension of events. An event is an emergence in a
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given context that must be described and narrated in order to be re-incorporated
into the flow of experience (Dewey 1993). For Dewey (1954), events can be
problematic situations, whose rupture demands reflexivity and a collective
quest for solutions through democratic conversation.
The political dimension of events was also highlighted by Arendt (1993) a
few decades later. For Arendt, some occurrences are so overwhelmingly unex-
plainable that they displace our established interpretive frameworks. The Nazi
totalitarianism regime, for instance, was something not only new, but some-
thing that demanded new categories of thought to render the world comprehen-
sible. Events, for Arendt, shed light on the ruin of our categories of thought and
judgments (Arendt 1993, p.49). At the same time, they set the end of processes;
they are the result of a thread that reconstructs its own past.
Since the 1970s, the political dimension of events has received increasing
attention in French academy. Foucault (2007) employed it to define the orders
of discourse. Historian Nora (1988) investigated how the mass media fostered
monstrous events that acquired unthinkable dimension. Mouillaud (2002) and
Charaudeau (1997) also discussed the role of the media in the construction of
events, pointing to the way that framing restricts un-catchable experiences in
order to make them apprehensible through discourse. In media studies, Dayan
and Katz (1994) analyzed the visibility of public ceremonies and rituals, argu-
ing that media events transform the world.
Poststructuralists have also made crucial contributions to the development
of the political dimension of the concept. From Deleuze (1975) to Badiou
(1994), the concept has been used to discuss the role of the unpredictable in so-
cial life. Zizek (2014) has used the concept of event to elaborate how recent up-
risings displace current frames. Events are essentially political. By changing the
past, they reinvent who we are and may become.
The literature on social movements also utilizes the concept of events. Very
often, the word “event” is employed to refer to episodes of contention. Accor-
nero and Pinto (2015), for example, advocate the Protest Event Analysis (PEA),
but do not use “event” as a concept, rather mobilize it as a word to refer to epi-
sodes of contention. As noted above, more frequently social movements schol-
ars focus on the transformative dimension of the events. The idea of Trans-
formative Events, proposed by McAdam and Sewell (2001) and adopted by
Goodwin and Jasper (2004) and Della Porta (2008), suggests that only certain
events (protests) “can produce radical turning points in collective action”
(Goodwin & Jasper 2004, p.246). Transformative events open new possibilities
for agency. McAdam and Sewell (2001) deal with the centrality of time to dis-
cuss political contention and criticize the way in which political science tends to
ignore this dimension by building time series that equalize events.
Building on Mendonça (2007) and Cefaï (2007; 2017) we emphasize the
hermeneutic power of the events. Following Mendonça (2007), in particular,
we argue that protests can be considered as events, to the extent they represent
ruptures and foster the reinterpretation of the past and the future, while opening
up a space for new political possibilities. When seen in this light, protests can be
seen as political struggles over meaning, affecting the way we interpret and ex-
perience the past and the future in the present. It is important to highlight that we
do not employ the concept to distinguish certain episodes from other events.
Similarly, we do not take the concept of event as a descriptive or a normative
tool to be tested by the reality. Rather, we use it as a theoretical lens to make
sense of the 2013 protests in Turkey and Brazil. This allows us to look at social
phenomena in a particular way, comprehending how they unfold in time and
space, and building a complex realism that encompasses interpretations within
the definition of reality. The concept leads to a particular way of looking at real-
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ity that sees occurrences spread over time and space, in doing so, it help us to
understand how re-interpretation of reality affects its future developments.
III. Background: 2013 Protests in Turkey and Brazil
The early 21st century has witnessed a re-emergence of contentious politics
worldwide in disparate parts of the globe including Turkey and Brazil (Della
Porta 2017).2 The Turkish protests began on 29 May 2013 in Taksim Square in
Istanbul as a response to government’s decision to build a new shopping mall
and residential complex on the grounds of a historically significant public park
(Gezi Park). On 30 May, police in Istanbul broke up a small demonstration at
Gezi Park using tear gas and burning their tents. What began as a peaceful envi-
ronmentalist protest quickly exploded into massive resistance, and it spread to
many other cities against the Justice and Development Party (JDP), or more
specifically its leader, then Prime Minister Erdogan. The brutal police reaction
to peaceful protest transformed the nature of the protest within a couple of days.
Protests changed from a local development issue to wider protests across Tur-
key about a broad range of issues including government encroachment on free-
dom of speech and Erdogan’s increasing authoritarianism. By 31 May, tens of
thousands were clashing with police units in different districts of Istanbul and
hundreds of protesters were under police custody (Amnesty International
2013).
Around the same time, in Brazil, a complex process of massive protests
emerged with Free Fare Movement calling citizens to march against the rise of
public transportation fares in São Paulo in the beginning of June 2013 (Ju-
densnaider et al., 2013; Maricato et al., 2013; Ricci & Arley 2014; Singer 2014;
Gohn 2014; Scherer-Warren 2014; Bringel & Pleyers 2015; França & Ber-
nardes 2016; Mendonça 2017; Bringel 2017). Police brutality, the visibility of
the controversial Confederations” Cup,3 growing indignation with public ex-
penditures and the political system, and a shift in the media coverage (from
de-legitimation to support) are some of the key factors that enlarged the scale of
the protests (Nogueira 2013; Nobre 2013; Ricci & Arley 2014). Fare increases
were revoked in São Paulo on June 19, but the protests kept intense at least until
the end of June and reached their climax on June 20, when more than two mil-
lion Brazilians were on the streets in hundreds of cities and towns.
There are many similarities between these two protests which make their
comparison particularly interesting. First, the demonstrations, in both countries,
were almost simultaneous. They are considered to be part of an ongoing cycle of
global protests, utilizing tactics and performances previously used in protests
such as the Arab Spring, the Indignados and the Occupy. Second, despite their
huge cultural and political differences, Brazil and Turkey share a history of po-
litical instabilities, and the 2013 protests lead to years of growing authoritarian-
ism. Third, in 2013 both countries experienced economic growth and stability,
and the protests were not preceded by an economic crisis or by the implementa-
tion of austerity policies as it was the case with other countries (Della Porta
2017). Finally, the 2013 protests in Brazil and Turkey were strongly marked by
political disputes over the actual meaning of what was going on and such
struggles had political implications in the developments following the protests.
The third factor seems to differentiate these countries from the contexts of
most of the other protests composing the broader cycle in which they are in-
serted. Most of the literature on the wave of mobilizations that took place in the
first two decades of the 21st century emphasizes how they tend to share two
common elements (Della Porta 2015; Accornero & Pinto 2015; Offe 2013;
Ortiz et al., 2013; Tejerina & Perugorría 2012): (1) a frontal contestation to the
political elites (and to the political system and representation broadly speaking);
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and (2) a refusal of austerity policies in the context of a crisis (Rüdig & Karyotis
2013). The first element also applies to Brazil and Turkey. Interestingly, how-
ever, the second one does not, as both countries were experiencing a period of
economic expansion, and austerity policies were not yet on the agenda (al-
though they began to emerge in the following years). In Brazil, for instance,
many protesters claimed for budgetary control in the face of the enormous pub-
lic expenditures with mega-events such as the World Cup and the Olympic
Games.
In both Brazil and Turkey, protests varied significantly in their form and
content, not only across cities and time, but also within each city and each pro-
test. In both countries, these massive movements led to symbolic struggles and
the emergence of conflicting meanings, what is an expected part of their charac-
terization as events. These struggles shaped not only the actual practices, but
also the consequences and developments of the protests. Symbolic struggles
can be defined as social processes that are characterized by disputes around the
definition of what is actually happening. In both Brazil and Turkey, the contra-
dictory ways through which the protests were understood and framed were at
the kernel of their developments. In both countries, there were lively debates
over the actual causes of these processes. Different interpretations saw different
pasts as evident, turning the unexpected and displacing occurrences into per-
fectly comprehensible narratives. As we elaborate further below, these debates
took the protests in different directions.
Although the symbolic struggles took place in various forms and in a diverse
range of arenas, this study focuses on social media platforms and especially the
online communications on Facebook. Our focus on Facebook as a platform for
discursive contestation is justified by the platform’s relevance throughout the
protests in both countries. The extensive use of social media, in particular
Facebook and Twitter, during the recent wave of protests has been studied from
different perspectives, and in fact, there is now an established scholarship that
recognizes the distinctive role of social media in political mobilization and in
creating non-traditional political platforms for civic engagement (Harlow &
Harp 2012; Castells 2012; Bennett & Segerberg 2013; Warren, Sulaiman &
Jaafar 2014; La Rosa 2014; Wojcieszak & Smith 2014; Theocharis et al., 2015;
Milan 2015; Tufekci 2017). These studies have showed that social media helps
to “assemble masses of individuals” onsite, enabling a new form of participa-
tory politics that transcends class, gender, ethnic, and ideological boundaries,
and the hierarchical structures of “old” social movements (Juris 2012). By cre-
ating “digitally mediated networks”, social media blurs the distinction between
real and virtual and online and onsite activisms, and in many cases, it bridges
these distinct spheres (Ratto & Boler 2014, p.23).
The use of social media during the 2013 protest movements in Turkey and
Brazil has also been discussed extensively both in the media and in many schol-
arly works. Gomes (2016), for instance defines the social networking sites in
the Brazilian demonstrations as the new arenas and structures of political strug-
gles. Malini et al. (2016) investigate the hashtag #vemprarua in 2013 and look
at both texts and images stressing the engagement around it in Brazil. Araújo,
Penteado and Santos (2015) and Segurado (2015) also emphasize the use of
SNS for mobilization in the 2013 protests. Researchers have also devoted atten-
tion to online controversies about violence in the demonstrations (D’Andréa &
Ziller 2014; Pereira & Santos 2016) and to the alternative coverage generated
by media activism in Brazil (Pennini & Barros 2015; Tosetto 2015)
Similarly, in the Turkish case, social media played a significant role. It
helped to mobilise the protestors in large numbers and enabled the movement to
take a pluralistic and an inclusive shape (Tufekci 2017). Many scholars have ex-
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amined the widespread use of social media during the course of events (see, for
example, Demirhan 2014; Farro & Demirhisar 2014; Mercea et al., 2017;
Odabas & Reynolds-Stenson 2017). The existing research suggests that social
media provided an alternative media platform by disseminating information
about the protests while mainstream media was silenced (Ozturkcan et al.,
2017). Twitter has been particularly influential in facilitating information shar-
ing (Demirhan 2014). While the use of social media did not produce radical out-
comes, it increased international awareness on the ongoing police repression in
Turkey and alarming use of tear gas during peaceful protests (Guner 2016).
In this article, we are interested in social media as a communication platform
that enables symbolic struggles over the causes of these protests and enriches
the hermeneutic power of protests as events. As such, our research contributes
to the existing scholarship on the role of social media in social movements in a
number of ways. First, various studies on the Brazilian and Turkish cases
mainly focus on the functions of social media in mobilizing the protestors. Our
study, however, examines the discursive contestations over the meaning of the
protests on social media and analyzes how such contestations contributed to ei-
ther frame transformations or frame extensions. Second, our focus on “frame
analysis” reveals the ways in which social media contributed to the “eventual”
dimension of meaning and shows how these symbolic struggles over the mean-
ing of these protests took place on online platforms. Finally, we do not look at
these pages to find a coherent and fixed way to frame the phenomena. Instead,
we seek to grasp the transformations in narratives across time as a component of
the phenomena in itself.
IV. Data and Methods
The analysis scrutinizes the ways the symbolic struggles played out in four
selected Facebook pages - two divergent pages for each country during the 2013
protests. For each page, we collected and analyzed the posts during the first 30
days of the protests. In the Brazilian case, we collected the posts of (1) Free Fare
São Paulo [“Passe Livre São Paulo”] (301,787 likes), the group that started the
wave of protests; and (2) The Giant Awoke [“O gigante acordou”] (155,690
likes), the group that emerged during the protests in mid-June, representing na-
tionalist stances.4 During the 30-days period (between 1 and 30 June), we found
626 posts in total on both pages: 242 in Free Fare Sao Paulo (MPL) and 384 in
The Giant Awoke (OGA).
In the Turkish case, we analyzed the posts that appeared on the Facebook
page of (1) Taksim Solidarity (TS) [Taksim Dayanismasi] (82,479 likes), an as-
sociation that played a significant role in the organization and mobilization of
the mass protest movements, and those of (2) Recep Tayyip Erdogan (RTE), a
pro-government, anti-protest site (6,957,408 likes). In the course of 30 days (28
May to 28 June 2013), we found a total number of 437 posts in both pages (397
in TS and 40 posts in RTE).
We have examined each post focusing particularly on the way they framed
the causes of the protests. Frame analysis is a method extensively used in vari-
ous ways and with diverse purposes (Goffman 1986; Entman 1993; Chong &
Druckman 2007; Mendonça & Simões 2012). It helps us to understand how ac-
tors make sense of the context in which they find themselves. Frame analysis of-
fers interpretive procedures to reconstruct meaning from the lenses of those
involved.
A frame is a particular way of classifying information that enables people to
make sense, relate and label everyday occurrences in a particular way (Goffman
1974). In this sense, “to frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and
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of posts on this page was so
high that Facebook does no
longer retrieve posts from a
significant part of June 2013,
obliging the study to discard
them.
make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a
particular problem definition, [and] causal interpretation” (Entman 1993, p.52).
Social movement studies have made frequent use of frame analysis in order to
understand the interpretive dynamics of political mobilization and of their so-
cial struggles (Benford & Snow 2000).5 Snow et al. (1986) provide an influen-
tial typology for the studies of political contention, when they investigate the
centrality of frame alignment for political engagement. They claim that frame
bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation are
frequent strategies in the quest to strengthen the mobilization processes.
We focused on content communicated in four selected Facebook pages dur-
ing the first 30 days of protests. We coded each Facebook post taking into ac-
count analytical categories and themes concerning how the causes of the
protests were framed in each post. We then identified the frequency of each
frame during the first 30 days of protests, and determine the change in the fre-
quency. This type of in-depth analysis allowed us to observe the dynamic sym-
bolic struggles over the interpretation of the causes of the protests, showing how
the lines of causality are not just out there to be found, but always subject to the
interpretation and re-interpretation of the actors involved in these events. By
seeking the root causes of the protests in the past (and thus reconstructing the
past), the protestors also proposed imagining the future in new ways.
V. Analysis: Symbolic struggles over the causes of protests in Brazil and Turkey
V.1. The Case of Brazilian Protests: Transportation vs Corruption
The Brazilian data shows clear symbolic struggles over different meanings
attached to the protests. In the quest to explain the events while they were still
happening, the actors engaged in the protests attempted to define what the strug-
gles were about. A long list of issues were mentioned in Facebook posts in order
to explain the causes. As the Chart 1 shows, the topic of public transportation
and fares dominated the posts.
Despite the preponderance of a particular cause that emerged in the Face-
book posts, one can gain a more nuanced understanding of the possible rise and
fall of particular causes by looking at this data across time. Chart 2 shows that
the issue of public transportation and fares remains unchallenged until June 13,
when the topic of police violence gains traction as an explanation for the pro-
tests. It should be noted that June 13 was a turning point in the Brazilian pro-
tests, as the police violence was broadly covered by the media and discussed by
protestors.
More interestingly, the Chart 2 shows a complete change after June 17. The
Facebook page “O Gigante Acordou” (OGA) was also created on June 17. Our
data from the initial 16 days include only the posts from “Passe Livre São
Paulo” (MPL), which was managed by the movement that triggered the pro-
tests. In contrast to MPL, OGA was not managed by a pre-existent movement.
The posts published on OGA’s page were more diverse, yet it is possible to no-
tice a strong focus on two aspects of the posts. First, there are two peaks of posts
that express criticisms against political actors and institutions, most of them de-
nouncing the practice of corruption. Second, many posts are declarative: they
make claims about a variety of themes, which this study aggregated under the
umbrella of rights, such as health, education, and housing. Chart 3 shows the
differences between the key issues on two Facebook pages during the first 30
days of the protests.
Our analysis of these posts suggests that the Facebook pages fostered di-
verse approaches in their framing of the causes of the protests. “O Gigante
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Acordou” employs a more diverse narrative, while, in the “Passe Livre São
Paulo”, it is possible to identify one particularly dominant cause: public trans-
portation and fares constitute 62% of the causes stated.6 Chart 4 adds one more
layer to this difference by presenting the distribution of the three prevalent is-
sues across time.
The symbolic struggles enveloping the protests became clearer as the pro-
tests evolved. On the one hand, we observe that the MPL which triggered
marches was motivated particularly by the issue of fares and public transporta-
tion. On the other hand, we see that the OGA explicitly challenged the centrality
of transportation fares (claiming “It is not for 20 cents”) and developed a more
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Source: Protests and Political Engagement Research Project.
Chart 1 - Frequency of issues on MPL and OGA Facebook pages between June 1-30,
2013
Source: Protests and Political Engagement Research Project.
Chart 2 - Frequency of issues mentioned in MPL and OGA Facebook pages between June 1-30, 2013
6 Despite the fact that the posts
from OGA started only on
June 17, our data collection
has more posts from this page
than from MPL.
diverse agenda and discourse against politicians and the existing political sys-
tem. It also highlighted many other social illnesses and injustices.
A qualitative analysis of the posts sheds further light on the way this sym-
bolic struggle actually occurred. The MPL’s focus became evident in some of
its first posts in June, when the movement called for protests in many neighbor-
hoods.
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Source: Protests and Political Engagement Research Project.
Chart 3 - Distribution of issues mentioned in MPL and OGA Facebook pages between
June 1-30, 2013
Source: Protests and Political Engagement Research Project.
Chart 4 - Distribution of three prevalent issues mentioned in MPL and OGA Facebook pages between June 1-30, 2013
“Tomorrow our trouble increases to R$3.20! Everybody against this robbery!
BIG PROTEST AGAINST FARE RISE – 06/06 -5 P.M. [...] The mayor has con-
firmed that bus fares will increase in the beginning of June to R$3.20. [...] Every
time fares rise, the number of people excluded from the transportation system
also grows – in 2010, there were already 37 million Brazilians that did not take
the bus every day because they could not afford it. Not having access to transpor-
tation means not accessing the city. [...] IF THE FARES INCREASE, THE
CITY WILL STOP! EVERY RISE IS AN INJUSTICE!”
The posts published by the MPL in the first days of June mainly attempted to
mobilize people. In Gamson’s (1992) typology, these posts tried to show an in-
justice, leading directly to a call for action. In order to do so, they repeatedly in-
vited people to future marches and showed the strength of the ongoing struggle.
“Attention everybody!!!
NEW DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE FARE RISE IS SCHEDULED
FOR TOMORROW (FRIDAY, JUNE 7). MEETING POINT AT LARGO DO
BATATA (PINHEIROS), 5 P.M. TODAY, THERE WERE 5 THOUSAND IN
THE STREETS. TOMORROW WILL BE BIGGER!!” (MPL, June 6, 2013).
The posts often showed images and videos from previous protests or news
articles that gave visibility to the demonstrations. Many images exhibited bus
turnstiles on fire or catchphrases such as “R$3.20 is robbery!” (Figure 1).
As the protests got bigger and spread over the country, the MPL sought to
emphasize the focused agenda that steered their struggles:
“This is a broad and popular struggle with one sole, clear and simple demand: the
reduction of bus fares from R$ 3.20 to R$ 3.00. This is what people in the streets
are demanding” (MPL, June 11, 2013).
A post published one day later, on June 12, reproduced an online article that
showed the impact of the fare rise in the lives of many people. According to the
article, many poor people had to skip some of their meals in order to afford the
costs of public transportation. MPL’s focus on the price expanded as the pro-
tests were repressed by the police. State violence became one important motive
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Figure 1 - Picture of demonstrators in the city of São Paulo burning turnstiles made of
card boxes. The banner on the back of the image states: “If the fares are not reduced,
São Paulo will stop!”
to go to the streets, and several posts reported the arbitrariness of detentions and
the class dimension of police violence.
“The truculence of the police and the selectivity of Justice – which distinguishes
poor and rich, people that demonstrate in defense of rights and business persons
– will not stop the continuity of our struggle. Police repression is the everyday
life of the excluded people of this city and we will never shut up in face of it. [...]”
(MPL, June 13, 2013).
The public statement of this “cause” (i.e. police brutality) became stronger
in MPL’s Facebook narratives after June 13, when the repression was particu-
larly strong (and covered by the mass media).
“We are watching regrettable episodes of police repression, which turned São
Paulo downtown into a battlefield. The 4th great march against fare rises was
peaceful and had more than 10 thousand people, when, around Roosevelt
Square, a brutal police repression took place. Demonstrators tried to reorganize
themselves, and the shock troops and the cavalry kept using stun bombs, rubber
bullets and tear gas. They are the ones responsible for this chaos in the city, not
us. We are in the streets, protesting in a legitimate way, against the segregating
rise of fares” (MPL, June 13, 2013).
Many posts asked protesters to send pictures and reports of aggressions they
had suffered. Other posts reported the situation of those arrested and the actions
taken by the lawyers of the movement.
The symbolic struggles on the causes of the protests became clear as they
spread and other actors including Facebook pages started talking about it. On
June 17, the posts of OGA began fostering a very different explanation of the
protests which invited people to fight against corruption and political actors.
OGA’s posts were much more frequently based on images and in most cases
they were not developed around broader arguments (Figure 2).
The meme clearly states that the struggle cannot be framed as “due to 20
cents” and it pushes another agenda: inadequate public expenditure and corrup-
tion. The “cause” should involve a broader agenda that targets political actors
and the political system. It also involves the poor quality of public services, such
as health and education. While the MPL insisted on the issue of fare rises and
12/27 Revista de Sociologia e Política v. 27, n. 69
Source: Image posted on OGA’s Facebook page (June 17 2013).
Figure 2 - Guy Fawkes’ mask with the sentences: “It is no longer about 20 cents” and
“Now we want the 80 billion back”
public transportation, OGA framed the 20-cent rise as a tiny element in a uni-
verse of “more important” issues (Figure 3).
The metaphor of the “water drop” was used to claim that what triggered the
protests was not its actual cause. It was simply the “last drop” that made the
country’s outrage spill. Many posts published on OGA’s page show the streets
filled with demonstrators, arguing that the country had finally realized the low
quality of public services, corruption, and self-interest of those in power and
awakened (Figure 4).
At the same time that OGA was trying to broaden the agenda of protests, the
MPL was tenaciously sustaining the “cause” of public transportation and its
fares. On June 19, the mayor and the governor of São Paulo revoked the fare in-
crease. The MPL celebrated the reduction, but, at the same time, it emphasized
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Source: Image posted on OGA’s Facebook page (June 18 2013).
Figure 3 - A Glass full of words: Violence, Corruption, Neglect, Lack of Education,
Cronyism, and Inflation. On top, a drop of 20 cents.
that the struggle around transportation had to continue. The movement also re-
inforced the agenda of state violence and emphasized the idea of a “life without
turnstiles”.
“The city will never forget what has happened in the last weeks. We have learnt
that only the struggle from below can defeat the interests from above. [...] The
route followed by the Free Fare Movement does not start or finish today. It con-
tinues towards a free public transportation, where decisions are taken by the us-
ers and not by politicians and business persons. [...] For a life without turnstiles!
[...]” (MPL, June 20, 2013).
The comprehension of the strategy of sustaining the focus on public trans-
portation required attention to the broader political context in which the protests
occurred. The MPL is a leftist progressive movement that is not aligned with
any political party. It had been pushing the agenda of free public transportation
for at least eight years when the protests emerged. When the protests spread
quickly, the movement perceived the risk of a shift in the agenda. Several dem-
onstrators associated their presence in the streets to challenge the Workers”
Party (PT) that had been ruling the country since 2003. They saw the protests as
a way to publicly state their outrage against corruption cases that were going to
be discussed by the Supreme Court in that same year. Empowered by the dis-
course of the crisis of representative democracy, they adopted a nationalist tone
to “clean” the country of parties and politicians. The MPL did not want to see it-
self linked to these discourses. They did not present themselves against the
Workers” Party (even if they did not support it), or raised flags against parties as
a whole. The MPL did not support the diffuse anti-party discourse.
At the same time, however, the MPL was part of the political struggles that
criticized the current practices of representative democracies and the permanent
denial of the “right to the city”. Evidently, the movement did not deny the im-
portance of education and health or the criticism of representatives. The point
was that these topics were framed in different ways and they were expressed
through the metaphor of a “city without turnstiles”. The idea was to show that
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Source: Image posted on OGA’s Facebook page (June 19 2013).
Figure 4 - Picture of a classroom (left) and picture of a stadium (right) in the same state.
In the bottom, the following sentence: “And they still ask why protests”
the right to the city encompassed several rights and freedom of movement
throughout the city was one of them.
“The struggle for the Free Fare is essential to assure access to public transporta-
tion. However, it is also essential because access to transportation means access
to other rights: the school, the hospital, the theater. It thus unifies all social strug-
gles. [...]
According to the National Association of Urban Transportation Companies, 37
million Brazilians do not have money to pay for fares regularly. This means that
they are excluded not only from transportation, but of all other rights. The turn-
stile that segregates people is not only on buses. The city is full of turnstiles,
many of them invisible, obstructing the access to health, education, sports, lei-
sure, other neighborhoods, downtown” (MPL’s Booklet, pp.3-4, Facebook,
June, 25 2013).
The MPL’s struggle was against the obstacles, expressed by the metaphor of
“turnstile”, which denied opportunities and rights to poor citizens. A life with-
out turnstiles depends, they argued, on a broad struggle against the segregation
generated by transportation fares. Such discursive frame helped the MPL to re-
late its demands to the broader agenda circulated within the public sphere with-
out losing its focus. It also helped the MPL to rebut a criticism directed to them
for their insistence in the initial cause. A post from OGA published a few days
earlier illustrates this criticism:
“Once upon a time, there was the Free Fare Movement, a movement with half a
dozen communists that unintentionally has been able to trigger the outrage of all
social classes. They have sold themselves and stopped. THE END! THE GIANT
IS AWAKE AND WILL GO ALL THE WAY THROUGH SO THAT BRAZIL
BECOMES A JUST COUNTRY!”
Through the metaphor of the “city without turnstiles” the movement linked
its focus to a broader agenda of rights, claiming to be struggling for a just soci-
ety and challenging the argument that it had given up. It attempted to show how
the “cause” it attributed to the protests encompassed many other causes, without
becoming a loose cannon. It used frame bridging, in Snow et al. (1986) terms, in
order to link the original demand to other claims and feelings publicly expressed
along the protests. However, in the symbolic struggles that constituted the pro-
tests, OGA argued that fares and issues related to public transportation were
nothing but a trigger for the expression of accumulated indignation against the
political system. They attempted to promote frame transformation, challenging
the interpretation of the ongoing struggle around transportation, and pushing a
nationalist frame according to which what was going on was a defense of the
country.
V.2. The Case of Turkish Protests: Protection of the park vs democratic rights
The posts on two selected Facebook pages, Taksim Solidarity (TS)7 and
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (RTE), present examples of the sym-
bolic struggles that took place during the first 30 days of the Gezi Park protests
in 2013. At the background of these struggles stand the question over the legiti-
macy of the protests underpinned by contested understandings of democracy.
The posts on the RTE page emphasize electoral democracy as the only legiti-
mate way of collective decision-making and seek to de-legitimatize the political
power of the protests. The posts on the TS page, in contrast, portray protesting
as a democratic right of individuals, especially in a political regime becoming
increasingly authoritarian. These different understandings of the legitimacy of
protests as a political activity stand at the background of further contestations
over the causes of the protests.
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7 Taksim Solidarity defines
itself as “a coalition of 124
trade unions, political parties,
community groups, sport club
fan groups and initiatives
embracing differences and
diversity, and expressing
demands through peaceful and
democratic means.” The
Coalition calls for “healthy
urbanization and liveable city”
and presents itself as the voice
of those who cry for “greener,
more liveable, humane and
Before we move on to the combined analysis of the Facebook posts, it is im-
portant to note some of the differences between the posts on the Facebook pages
of TS and RTE. These posts do not only differ in numerical terms (the number
of posts on TS’s page is significantly higher than RTE’s in the same period),
there are also important qualitative differences. While TS started posting con-
tent related to the protests from the very first day of protests (May 28), the first
protest related post on RTE’s page appeared on the sixth day of protests (June
2). Between May 28 to June 2, the posts on the RTE page actively ignored the
protests and sought to establish a different “reality” about the political situation
in the country.
In the first 5 days, RTE’s Facebook page included news about the achieve-
ments of the governing Justice and Development Party (JDP) focusing “suc-
cessful” infrastructure projects. The first protest related post appeared in June.
This post portrayed the protests as futile efforts of a small number of marginal
groups who had lost at the ballot box. It read:
“These are the efforts of those who could not win at the ballot box. Our prime
Minister defined Taksim Gezi Park protests as the extremist activity of the mar-
ginal groups... He said “They should know that we will all go to ballot box in ten
months time. The people will give the required response through the ballot box...
This is a solidarity of extremist marginal groups supported by the opposition
party, People’s Republic Party” (June 2, 2013, RTE’s Facebook page).
The post illustrates the dominant government narrative about the Gezi Park
protests. It frames the protests as an anti-democratic movement of “extremist
groups” taking place against the will of the majority. This and similar posts on
the RTE’s page sought to mobilize supporters for pro-government counter ral-
lies, “Respect for the National Will”, which took place in various major cities
two weeks after Gezi protests started.
TS’s page, in contrast, sought to mobilize the protesters and framed protest-
ing as a democratic right of citizens, e.g., against police violence, the authoritar-
ian regime of the JDP Government or illegal construction works in public
spaces. Besides bringing the symbolic struggles over the causes of the protests
to the fore, the TS Facebook page also served as a platform to disseminate prac-
tical information on a wide variety of issues ranging from first aid against tear
gas to legal advice for those who were arrested during the protests. Especially
with the increase of police violence, TS page became a key site of information
on a variety of topics to assist protestors.
When we leave out the posts that are not about the protests or do not touch
the causes of the protests, the combined analysis of the posts from both pages,
from May 28 to June 27, reveals eight key reasons for the protests, as shown in
Chart 5.
What is noteworthy, in light of the interpretation of protests as “events”, is
how these reasons evolved, lost or gained traction over time. Chart 6 lays out the
frequency of different causes for protests as mentioned in both Facebook pages.
The two reasons mentioned on RTE’s page, “conspiracy against the govern-
ment” and the “electoral failure of the opposition” do pop up, yet in an eclectic
rather than a continuous manner. They seem to be published to validate the
dominant government narrative at the time. Overall, the pro-government dis-
course sought to delegitimize the protests either by presenting them as actions
and demands of a few marginalized individuals, or by situating them away from
“ballot box” results and electoral democracy more generally.
As noted, the majority of the posts that bring the causes of the protests to the
fore steams from TS’s Facebook page. The most frequently articulated reason
for the protests was “solidarity with those who protest”. These posts empha-
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democratic city and country”
(Taksim Dayanisma 2013).
sized the need to show solidarity with the ones protesting on the ground, coming
from various places both within Turkey and from abroad. The second wide-
spread reason for the protests concerned the police violence against (peaceful)
protesters. The third frequently mentioned cause was the authoritarian regime
of the governing Justice and Development Party (JDP). The existing literature
notes the increasing state oppression and authoritarian style of the government
as significant reasons for the emergence and the proliferation of the Gezi Park
protests (Abbas 2013; Gole 2013).
Having said that, it is difficult to disentangle these three prevalent issues
from each other. Police violence is and can be seen as a clear manifestation of an
authoritarian regime. These two causes, in return, obviously feed into the need
to show solidarity to those who suffer under police violence and an authoritar-
ian regime.
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Source: Protests and Political Engagement Research Project.
Chart 5 - Frequency of issues on TS and RTE Facebook pages between 28 May and 26
June 2013
Source: Protests and Political Engagement Research Project.
Chart 6 - Frequency of issues mentioned in TS and RTE Facebook pages between 28 May and 26 June 2013
As the Chart 7 shows, May the 30th was a turning point in Gezi Park pro-
tests.8 The number of posts emphasizing police violence increased drastically.
This went hand to hand with the rise of posts expressing solidarity to protesters.
The police intervention to the park with tear gas and water cannons and the de-
struction of protest tents on that day transformed protests from being a small-
scale environmental protest into one of the biggest nation-wide movements in
the history of the Turkish Republic. The initial reason of the protests, the re-
moval of a handful of trees at Gezi Park to build a shopping mall, was dismissed
as the cause of the subsequent upheaval. Instead, protesters began to emphasize
the increasingly authoritarian policies of the government (Benhabib 2013). A
post on June 6, for example, reads that “Three uprooted trees in Taksim Gezi
Park turned into a struggle of democratic rights in all over Turkey”. A call for
the “right to the city” turned into a call for the “right to live in a truly democratic
country” (Taksim Solidarity’s page, June 6, 2013). Similarly, the press release
published on this page on June 2 establishes the legitimacy of the Gezi Park
movement by referring to PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s anti-democratic poli-
cies of restrictions on freedom of speech and the State’s interventions in indi-
vidual life styles. In this press release, protesting is presented as a legitimate
right of citizens against the state “which tries to instill a fear atmosphere in order
to transform the whole society into a large prison through suppression, violence
and force” (June 2, 2013). Tayyip Erdogan, who was the Prime Minister then,
declined the use of force, claimed that he personally gave the order, and that he
was proud of the police force’s work during the protests (Radikal 2013).
The uncompromising tone of Erdogan fueled the tensions but at the same
time it had an important transformative effect. Arguably, it brought together dif-
ferent groups which were traditionally antagonistic to each other. These groups
created a deliberative space that contested the notion of “the other” historically
constructed in Turkey, politically, economically, and socially (Mendonça &
Ercan 2015). Protests included a variety of groups such as trade unions, envi-
ronmentalist, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) groups, femi-
nist groups and “anti-capitalist Muslims”. A progressive dialogue with the
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Chart 7 - Distribution of three prevalent issues mentioned in TS and RTE Facebook pages between 28 May and 26 June 2013
8 Konda Research and
Consultancy’s survey (2014)
involving 4411 participants
between July 6-7, 2013,
similarly suggests that 73% of
the protestors who identified
themselves as “ordinary
citizens” decided to actively
get involved in the protests
after police violence.
Kurdish minority was also evident during the protests. Such dialogues contrib-
uted to the construction of Gezi Park protests as a pluralistic movement that
went beyond the interests of Istanbul’s middle class.
The pictures that circulated on TS’s page brought this diversity into focus.
For example, Figure 5 shows two men, one holding a Turkish flag and the other
the flag of the Peace and Democracy Party, which represented the Kurdish mi-
nority between 2008 and 2014. This image signifies the symbolic solidarity be-
tween nationalist and Kurdish forces during the protests against state violence
and reads as “an exceptional moment of resistance in Taksim”. This solidarity,
however, should not be read as finding a common language between Turks and
Kurds. But it suggests to remember the violent past and forgotten injustices in
order to alter the present relations between majority and minority groups. As
such, this act of solidarity offers an illuminating example of protests as events.
The disruption caused by the protests created a space for reflection and interpre-
tation about the past and future of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, which consti-
tutes one of the most pressing political issues in Turkey.
Similarly, the protests also brought a fresh perspective on the way the rela-
tionship between secular and Islamic groups are conceived by each other. Fig-
ure 6 shows, for instance, the Friday prayers taking place at the Taksim Square
in support of the protests.
These images did not simply represent the “real world” of the Gezi Park,
they also played a meaning-making role by contesting established dichotomies
between secularism/religion and Turkishness/Kurdishness. They opened new
possibilities of co-existence among traditionally conflicting groups. Such im-
ages helped to imagine and reinforce the possibilities of solidarity across deep
divisions. Furthermore, during the course of events, these images made the po-
lice violence visible and emphasized the non-violent character of the protests.
Such tactics of making state repression visible worked against the PM Er-
dogan’s posts that constructed the protests as a violent attempt of a few
“marginals”.
The emphasis on “life” against “death” and “destruction” produced by the
police is also evident in many posts. For example, a post published on TS page,
on June 4, made it explicit that “Our resistance is peaceful, not destructive”. The
discursive framing of protests as “non-violent peaceful resistance” was also
sustained through posting photos of workshops organized for children and of a
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Source: Image posted on TS Facebook page (12 June 2013).
Figure 5 - ‘An exceptional moment of resistance in Taksim’ 12 June 2015
library at the park (Figure 7, Figure 8). In its press release published on June 11,
Taksim Solidarity stated:
“For two weeks women, youth, gays and lesbians, socialists, and those who be-
lieve and who do not have been calling for their democratic rights in sev-
enty-seven cities through poems, songs, slogans, and dance. The government,
however, not only refuses to hear these demands, it also threatens its own citi-
zens and organizes pro-government protests, and in doing so, the government fu-
els polarization in the society”.
Such portrayal of peaceful and non-violent character of the protests against
the violent character of police intervention helped to establish not only the legit-
imacy of the protests, but also brought the shifting causes of the protests to the
fore.
VI. Discussion
Having shown the symbolic struggles around the “causes” of the protests,
we now return to our original assumptions and explain why the concept of event
is important to comprehend these movements. The concept proves to be helpful
in at least three important ways. First, it enables us to conceive the symbolic
struggles as a central element of the processes. Events are not “already there”:
they are built through collective meaning-making processes and discursive
struggles. Second, the concept sheds light on the tangible consequences of these
struggles. The way the process is framed has actual consequences for the conti-
nuity of the event itself. Different interpretations of the past and the present
open and close diverse possibilities for the future. Third, the concept of events
suggests avoiding a sterile (and very frequent) question pervading the literature
on protest movements: when have they actually started? The concept helps to
show that the past of a protest movement is continuously reconstructed along
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Source: Image posted on TS Facebook page (7 June 2013).
Figure 6 - Co-existence of diverge beliefs, 7 June 2013
the struggle. Different interpretations of the protests” causes or origins are
themselves part of the political dimension of these processes. With different
interpretations, the event keeps taking different directions and transforms itself.
In both Brazil and Turkey, protests entailed intense symbolic struggles over
what was going on. Different groups established different origins and causes for
the protests and their interpretations yielded different consequences in terms of
future possibilities. In Brazil, the Free Fare Movement (MPL) presented a fo-
cused struggle over the right to the city. By emphasizing the main cause of the
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Source: Image posted on TS Facebook page (10 June 2013).
Figure 7 - ‘Children’s Workshop: Not the voice of violence, but the voice of peace is
rising at Gezi’
Source: Image posted on TS Facebook page (7 June 2013).
Figure 8 - Gezi Library
protests in terms of an issue of transportation, they resisted the diversification of
the agenda and the possible political uses of such diversification. This did not
mean that MPL had a limited claim. The group also presented a wider perspec-
tive through the turnstile metaphor, which worked as a bridging frame. In con-
trast to MPL, The Giant Awoke (OGA) presented a pulverized agenda mainly
targeting politicians, the political system and the lack of rights in the country. It
sought to promote a frame transformation process, arguing that the causes to
demonstrate were rather different (and broader) than the claims raised by MPL.
By linking the protests to a crisis of representation, they opened possibilities for
the de-legitimation of the Federal Government and the Workers’ Party (PT). Al-
though MPL did not support PT, it did not support the right-wing adversaries of
PT either. In these symbolic struggles, each interpretation of the protests”
causes implied diverse horizons of possible futures.
This interpretive contention was a struggle that had consequences in terms
of who was at the streets and what would result from this. MPL, at one point, de-
cided to leave the streets. OGA accused it of having sold itself and of giving up a
struggle for a just country. MPL presented its conception of justice through the
idea of the right to the city, bridging its struggles with many claims mobilized
by other actors. OGA sought a frame transformation, proposing an anti-politics
view in order to explain the lack of rights. The symbolic struggles over the event
disclosed a dispute over the streets and over the future of the country.
As events cannot be entirely circumscribed spatially and temporally, it is
possible to trace some of the developments of these symbolic struggles in the
years following 2013. The year of 2014 was marked by an enormous political
polarization, expressed in the presidential elections. Despite the re-election of
president Dilma Rousseff (PT), her legitimacy was deeply challenged by sev-
eral actors. She won with 51,64% of the votes, against 48,36% of her chal-
lenger. The North and the Northeast of the country (poorer areas) mostly voted
for Rousseff, while the South and the Southeast (richer areas) voted for Aécio
Neves (PSDB). In 2015, the deepening of corruption investigations led to new
massive protests on the streets, most of them in the nationalist anti-politics tone
adopted by OGA. Some demonstrators claimed for a military intervention, sug-
gesting that democracy, broadly defined, was not capable to solve the country’s
problems. This year was characterized by overwhelming political instability
and economic crisis. In 2015, the National Congress started to evaluate a re-
quest for the impeachment of President Rousseff and approved her removal
from the office on 31 August 2016. This development shows that the frame
transformation advanced in OGA posts (and in many other arenas by several so-
cial actors) succeeded in molding the consequences of the event.
In Turkey, those initiating and organizing the protests were the ones at-
tempting to enlarge the interpretive frames defining the causes of the events.
They sought to show that their struggle was not only an environmental claim
against a shopping center, but a broader fight against the authoritarianism of
then Prime Minister Erdogan. They deliberately sought a frame extension, capa-
ble to expand the boundaries of the struggle to encompass different views and
involve diverse groups. Against the acts of frame extension, Erdogan’s support-
ers sought to restrict the scope of the struggle by framing the protests as illegiti-
mate political action carried out by a handful of extremists. They sought to
depoliticize the causes of the protests by keeping the discussion focused on the
construction of a shopping mall or by denying to engage with the reasons put
forward by pro-protest groups such as Taksim Solidarity.
As such, symbolic struggles in Facebook posts were not simply a struggle
over the meaning of the Gezi protests. What they revealed was the broader and
deeper disputes over the meaning of democracy in Turkey. The event of Gezi
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Park did not resolve the disputes over how democracy worked, but created vari-
ous forms of displacement over its meanings. The inclusive language of the
Gezi protests helped to challenge the provocative and patriarchal tone of Turk-
ish politics (Varol 2014). The protests opened up new possibilities for demo-
cratic involvement, especially concerning the neighborhood councils organized
around city parks (Mert 2016, p.13).
The Gezi Park protests certainly did not create a shift in the government’s
treatment of minorities and oppressed voices. In fact, since then the government
has significantly increased its surveillance powers over these voices and contin-
ued to suppress any small-scale protest movement. However, the Gezi protests
created a diverse range of awareness within the public sphere. In the words of
anthropologist and journalist Ayse Cavdar, a key achievement of the Gezi pro-
tests was “to shatter the narrow identities imposed by state discourse”. Gezi
brought together a diverse range of identities; conservative Muslims and secu-
larists, nationalist Turks and Kurds, Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis. Gezi Protests
were a response to the longstanding political silencing and oppression of differ-
ent sections of Turkish society, and therefore it cannot be reduced to another
secular Kemalist movement. The inclusive nature of the protests triggered new
discourses in Turkish social and political life. Perhaps the rise of pro-Kurdish
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in recent years and its increased popularity
not only among Kurdish citizens, but Turkey’s other minority groups, can be
seen as one of the long-term effects of Gezi. In 2015 general elections, PDP
managed to surpass the draconian 10% threshold in Turkish election system and
gained 88 seats in the Parliament. This success was also the outcome of the
party’s deliberative shift in its discourse from only promoting Kurdish rights to-
wards incorporating rights of all minority groups that had been traditionally
oppressed in Turkish social and political life (see for example, Bozcali & Cagri
2013; Unan 2015)
The question here is not so much whether such “awakenings”, occurred dur-
ing and after the Gezi protests, have led to great transformations, “ruptures”, in
Turkish politics. The question is what forms of “cracks” the Gezi protests cre-
ated in the social and political fields. In this regard, we also need to resist roman-
ticizing the Gezi experience and recognize its limitations in the areas of political
inclusion/exclusion and in the public recognition of the past experiences of dis-
possession in Turkey (Parla & Ozgul 2016). Seen in these terms, we also argue
that the Gezi Park protests did not lead to any “tangible cracks” in Turkish poli-
tics, but showed the potential of transformative politics that could turn them-
selves into “ruptures”. Therefore, it is important to see the Gezi protests not
simply as a symbol of the new form of inclusive political activism in Turkey,
but as an ongoing event: a symbolic struggle over the meaning of the event
itself, the impact of which continues today.
In the case of 2013 protests, the symbolic struggles over the events were es-
sentially a field for broader political battles, in which different reinterpretations
of the past is connected with diverse possibilities for the future. This points out
to the interpretive power of events, which lies in their capacity to open a chasm,
showing the contingency of a society that can never be fully sutured. By
re-opening the past, the rupture re-opens the future in very practical ways. Our
study shows how such symbolic struggles can follow different paths in different
countries. While in Brazil the frame extension has put democracy in jeopardy,
in Turkey, it was essential to challenge authoritarianism and foster democratic
ideals.
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Protestos como “Acontecimentos”: as lutas simbólicas nas manifestações de 2013 no Brasil e na Turquia
RESUMO Introdução: O conceito de “acontecimento” oferece uma perspectiva interessante para a compreensão de disputas
discursivas nos protestos e sobre eles. Por “acontecimento”, entendemos rupturas da continuidade da experiência que alimentam
disputas políticas pela reinterpretação de passados e futuros. Partindo do conceito e de sua utilidade para a leitura de disputas
simbólicas, este artigo busca analisar os protestos de 2013 no Brasil e na Turquia. Investigamos como as razões a alicerçar tais
protestos foram enquadradas e como esses enquadramentos mudaram ao longo do tempo, abrindo novas interpretações de passado e
provendo novas possibilidades de imaginação do futuro. Materiais e Métodos: Dados foram gerados a partir de quatro páginas do
Facebook, coletando mensagens postadas ao longo dos primeiros 30 dias de protestos em cada um dos países. No caso brasileiro,
coletamos os posts de: (1) Passe Livre São Paulo (301.787 likes), o grupo que iniciou a onda de protestos; e (2) O Gigante Acordou
(155.690 likes), um coletivo que emergiu durante os protestos, representando perspectivas nacionalistas. Ao todo, foram coletados
626 posts em ambas as páginas. No caso turco, analisaram-se posts que apareceram em: (1) Taksim Dayanismasi (82.479 likes), uma
associação que teve papel significativo na organização e mobilização dos protestos do Gezi Park; e (2) Recep Tayyip Erdogan
(6.957.408 likes), uma página pró-governo e essencialmente anti-protestos. Codificamos cada post indutivamente, enfocando,
particularmente, o modo como eles enquadraram as causas dos protestos. Identificamos, então, a frequência de cada enquadramento
nos 30 dias iniciais dos protestos e exploramos se, e como, isso se transformou ao longo do tempo. Resultados: A análise revelou a
existência de viradas significativas na forma como as causas dos protestos foram enquadradas em ambos os países, mas com
implicações distintas. Enquanto no Brasil, a “transformação de quadro” observada minou o foco inicial dos manifestantes, na Turquia,
observa-se uma situação de “expansão do quadro”, com a tematização de questões mais amplas como causas dos protestos, como a
natureza autoritária do regime e as restrições a direitos democráticos no país. Discussão: O artigo oferece uma maneira de analisar
protestos com base na lente conceitual do “acontecimento”, esclarecendo o papel das mídias sociais no contexto das lutas simbólicas
em torno dos protestos. Além disso, ele abre debate sobre as disputas de enquadramento a atravessar desdobramentos con-
temporâneos da democracia em ambos os países.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: acontecimento; protestos; Gezi Park; Jornadas de Junho; Facebook.
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